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
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
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


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NDU/ICAF	83/051	AD-A137683
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
GRAND STRATEGY--A NECESSARY FRAMEWORK FOR LASTING INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS		MSP #47A AY 82/83
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER		
7. AUTHOR		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER
COL JAMES I. MC DOWELL, USA		
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES FORT LESLEY J. MC NAIR WASHINGTON, DC 20319		
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES FORT LESLEY J. MC NAIR WASHINGTON, DC 20319		MAY 1983
13. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		14. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY FORT LESLEY J. MC NAIR WASHINGTON, DC 20319		UNCLASSIFIED
15. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
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17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
N/A		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
N/A		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
N/A		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
This paper looks behind the ups and downs of past United States Defense Preparedness Postures and asks the basic question--Why have our policies and practices not been more consistent over the long term? It relates our ability to maintain credible industrial mobilization preparedness planning to the answer.		

THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

MOBILIZATION STUDIES PROGRAM REPORT

GRAND STRATEGY
A Necessary Framework for Lasting
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS

by

Colonel James I. McDowell, USA

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT


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THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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ABSTRACT OF STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

NAME OF RESEARCHER (S) McDowell, James I. Colonel, USA	TITLE OF REPORT GRAND STRATEGY--A Necessary Frame- work for Lasting Industrial Mobilization Preparedness
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	REPORT NUMBER M MSP 47A

ABSTRACT

PROBLEM STATEMENT: This paper looks behind the ups and downs of past United States Defense Preparedness Postures and asks the basic question--Why have our policies and practices not been more consistent over the long term? It relates our ability to maintain credible industrial mobilization preparedness planning to the answer.

FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS:

1. There has been a significant shift in the balance of power vis-a-vis the U.S. and our principal allies and the Soviet Union over the last several years.
2. Our future, as well as the free world's, depend more than ever upon the steadiness and maturity of American leadership and upon the manner by which we employ our national power to promote and secure our global interests.
3. Some American characteristics, traditions, institutions and practices inhibit our ability to think and act strategically.
4. As a nation and as leader of the free world, we face unprecedented challenges.
5. To a large degree our ability to meet these challenges depends upon our ability to adjust some of our most basic beliefs and practices to a more realistic understanding of and adaptation to global strategic requirements of a superpower.
6. Such adaptions are critical prerequisites to maintaining consistent long term defense and mobilization preparedness.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The U.S. develop a "grand" strategy along the lines conceptualized in this paper. Such a strategic framework should emphasize careful identification of U.S. "vital" interests and threats thereto, and development of long term U.S. strategic objectives and plans. The focus should be non partisan in nature and seek to develop popular support and an enduring consensus concerning fundamental national security issues. Within this framework, long term "total" industrial mobilization planning should be conducted, both as a strategic deterrent and to enhance our warfighting capabilities should deterrence fail.

THIS ABSTRACT IS UNCLASSIFIED

PREFACE

This research started unknowingly in 1981 and 1982 while I was a student in the corresponding studies program of the U.S. Army War College. It was through this experience that I gained my first real insight into and initial understanding of the concepts of strategy--both military and national or "grand" strategy. It was also during this experience that I first became aware of the dilemma we face with industrial mobilization preparedness, although I did not make the connection between the two at that time.

As a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, I have had the opportunity to sharpen my understanding of and appreciation for both subjects. This occurred mainly through my participation in the "core" curriculum of the College, but also through two elective courses in Fundamental Ideas, (1) Classical Readings in Political Thought and, (2) Classical Readings in Military Thought plus through my participation in the Mobilization Studies Program. In the latter effort I concentrated on the industrial mobilization lessons from World War II and the early 1950s.

It was during the latter effort that I connected the two: industrial mobilization preparedness and (our need for) a "grand" strategic framework. As I began to realize that the lessons from past United States industrial mobilizations had been learned, but not followed consistently--I started pondering the underlying question of why? This query brought me to the conclusion that we need some vehicle to help us better articulate the need for a more consistent, well thought out long-term approach to the way we conduct business as a nation--not just for industrial mobilization, or defense, but for all our elements of power: political, economic, moral, psychological, technological, and military. This concept of a grand strategic framework deals with our internal strengths as well as with those we exercise in the international arena.

In pursuing this line of thinking, I encountered what appears to be problems with some of our most cherished American beliefs, institutions and practices. At this point I realized that if I pushed this inquiry further, some readers might think I was unnecessarily attacking basic American beliefs and practices. This is not my intent, however, I found that to be intellectually honest, I could not avoid these sensitive issues. I accordingly addressed them as cautiously as possible--for I perceive some of them to be root causes behind our basic problems thinking and acting strategically as a nation. It is further my judgement that unless we are willing to consider them more openly, they will remain impediments to long term, comprehensive United States strategic policies and preparedness.

Before proceeding, it is appropriate that I acknowledge those people who have particularly helped me in this undertaking. My thanks and appreciation are extended to fellow ICAF students William D. Kutac, LTC (P), U.S. Army and Day O. Mount, S.E.S.-1, Department of State; to Dr. Ralph Sanders, GS-15, of the ICAF faculty; to Roderick L. Vawter, GS-15, and Joseph E. Muckerman, GS-15, my research sponsors from the Mobilization Concepts Development Center, National Defense University, and to LTC Orville J. Hengen, Jr., U.S. Army, Defense Attaché to Bangladesh.. Their detailed reviews and critiques of my draft transcripts were of great assistance to me. Lastly, I want to thank my wife, Susan, who patiently typed and critiqued all of my initial drafts.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study considers credible plans to mobilize United States economic and industrial capabilities to be more important today than anytime in our past. This evaluation is based upon the increased global military threat from the Soviet Union which has equalled our strategic nuclear capabilities and has general superiority of tactical nuclear and conventional forces. These factors combine to reduce U.S. nuclear "escalation control," hence re-emphasizes our need for strong conventional forces. This factor per se greatly increases the deterrent value of credible plans to rapidly mobilize our vast economic and industrial capabilities and the importance of such plans to rapidly realize our warfighting potential should deterrence fail.

The lessons of past United States' industrial mobilizations have been exhaustively documented and, in the past, comprehensive mobilization plans have been prepared therefrom. The disturbing fact remains, however, that throughout history we have repeatedly been found ill prepared to rapidly convert our economic and industrial capabilities to warfighting potential. We again find ourselves in this unprepared state of mobilization readiness today.

Since the industrial mobilization lessons of the past have been learned but not followed--this study questions why this phenomena continues to plague our nation's defense posture.

The answers to this troublesome problem are many and varied. Root causes are found amongst several inherent American characteristics, traditions, behaviors, institutions, and some of the practices of our form of democratic government. This study delves into this "touchy" problem and concludes that as a nation we have some practices and behaviors which work against our best long term strategic interests. For most of the post World War II period when we possessed overwhelming economic and military power relative to that of our friends and enemies, this situation was not critical. However, as our relative balance of power has decreased vis-a-vis the developed world and the Soviet Union, our free world leadership position is increasingly challenged.

This study discusses these factors and their impact upon our increasing free world leadership challenges. It concludes that, as a nation, we need to carefully evaluate some of our basic beliefs and past practices and make certain key changes which will better enable us to meet our future strategic challenges. My primary recommendation is that as a nation we need to develop and apply a United States "grand" strategy which integrates and employs all elements of national power--economic, political, psychological, moral, technological, as well as military toward the protection and promotion of our "vital" interests. Such a strategy must be based upon a realistic evaluation of the threat we face and the development of long term strategic objectives to counter them. Such a strategic framework will allow us to better calculate

the "means" required to counter these threats and to promote United States interests over the long term. It is suggested that such a strategic framework is the backdrop necessary for us to properly rationalize the need for "total" industrial mobilization preparedness planning and to develop and maintain the requisite national resolve to allow them to endure over time.

This study concludes with a recommended theoretical and strategic outline such a United States "grand" strategy might require.

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- GRAND STRATEGY -
A Necessary Framework for Lasting
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Advanced planning to rapidly mobilize American industry to respond to a major national emergency is more critical today than at anytime in our past. Considering this a real and important problem, I started my Industrial College research project as a member of a group seeking to identify the lessons learned from past United States industrial mobilizations. The intent of that effort was to identify the important historical lessons, compare them to today's mobilization preparedness, and provide recommendations to help us improve upon our future capabilities. Shortly after undertaking this effort, however, I concluded that the pertinent lessons and recommendations from both our World Wars I and II and from our Korean War era industrial mobilizations had been extensively documented and that comprehensive mobilization planning structures had been developed following these experiences. The disturbing fact which I derived from this review, however, was that we have never consistently followed these lessons and that since World War I we have been found repeatedly ill prepared to mobilize our vast warfighting potential. This situation, as is now well known, is unfortunately the case again today--we are sadly unprepared to rapidly mobilize our vast economic and industrial potential. Congress and the Reagan Administration are again attempting to overcome this major shortfall in our security posture which was allowed to develop during the 1970s.

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At this point I found myself more challenged to try to determine why the United States continues to experience this roller coaster pattern of defense and therefore mobilization preparedness. Although I still believe it is vitally important that we understand and apply relevant lessons from our history, it now appears more important than ever that we attempt to understand the forces at work within our society which have prevented us from maintaining a consistently adequate defense posture over the long run. At present, even though I applaud current initiatives to redress our critical defense and industrial mobilization shortfalls, based upon historical precedent there is no reason to be optimistic that they would last any longer than our past similar efforts. I accordingly made this concern the major thesis of this additional individual research effort.

As a result of this research I have concluded that there should be a greater national understanding of this problem and a far greater sense of urgency than I believe exists toward efforts to resolve it. As I will attempt to develop in this paper, we as a people and as a nation have many deeply engrained traditions, and social and psychological factors which make it difficult for us to deal with this problem effectively. We have been blessed with abundance, a creative and hardworking people, geographical protection, a productive climate, etc., which have worked to our decided advantage. We adopted a form of government based upon individual freedoms and liberties and an economic system based upon capitalism and free enterprise which have also served us well. Largely as a result of these factors we are strongly individualistic and have been exceptionally successful. Compared to most other nations we have achieved enviably high standards of living and material

well being. Along with these blessings and strengths, we historically have also had a generally isolationist outlook toward the rest of the world and we have approached many great problems with a rather impatient and short term outlook. So far, our blessings and strengths have prevailed over our weaknesses and explain the basis for the great nation we have become.

It is at this point in our history, however, that we should have reason for concern. The world has rapidly grown smaller and our role in it far greater. Our own future and that of the free world now depend, more than at anytime in the past, upon the steadiness and maturity of American leadership and upon the manner by which we employ our national power to promote and secure our global interests. At some point in the recent past the United States emerged upon the world scene as a major power. This transformation was certainly hastened by the outcome of World War II. But, and this might be a controversial point, the United States at the end of that war did not face anywhere near the leadership challenge it faces today in terms of the potential dangers of absolute destruction of the Republic.

As a result of the massive destruction during World War II to our friends and allies as well as to our former enemies, the United States became the only major power left intact and by far the most powerful nation in the world, both economically and militarily. We then assumed unquestioned leadership of the free world. With this overwhelming balance of power differential in our favor, the United States was able to prevail more or less unchallenged on the international scene for twenty plus years. Historically, such a high concentration of power in but one nation state must be considered an aberration. Today the situation is far different. The world is in a more

balanced state except for the dangerous bipolarity between the U.S. and the USSR. The relative balance of power between the United States and the developed democracies of the free world and with the Soviet Union is considerably lessened today from what it was in the earlier post war years. This is an important consideration in evaluating our strategic situation and demands from us a far greater degree of sophistication and mature leadership than was earlier required.

Concerning the thesis of this paper, I will argue that this situation requires a more strategic global perspective and longer term more consistent application of our national policies than in the past. As a key requirement, and if history is to prove us up to the task, we as a nation are going to have to carefully evaluate some of our traditional beliefs, institutions and practices and make some critical adaptations to adequately meet our future free world leadership challenges. It is our ability to recognize this need and our ability to make the necessary changes that are of concern to this observer.

The fact that many of our friends and allies are now major economic powers with whom we compete in world markets tends to make our strategic situation more difficult. They can now act more independently in their own interests. Our situation is also more difficult because we in fact face a greatly strengthened military power in the Soviet Union. She is now the first true global power that has confronted the United States; Germany and Japan during World War II were regional powers and threats. Since the Soviet Union has gained strategic nuclear parity with the United States and, along with the Warsaw Pact, retains tactical nuclear and conventional military superiority over our NATO/Japan alliances, she is a far greater threat to be reckoned with.

Strategically the Soviet Union gained her military superiority over the U.S. by applying consistent policies and by deliberate allocation of resources over the long run--while the United States pursued the roller coaster defense policies mentioned earlier. With comparable U.S. consistency of policy and resolve, we would not now face a "window of vulnerability." We would also not have to expend as many dollars in the long run as we will end up spending if we are to successfully redress this gap in our defense preparedness. Most significantly, without their military power base it is reasonable to believe that the Soviets would not have attempted to gain their strategic footholds in Asia, Africa and South America which now increasingly threaten our "vital interests." Most critically, if we do not learn from this lesson, it is predictable that we will one day soon find ourselves too far behind to catch up! The other factors which make our strategic situation most difficult, are the factors earlier mentioned relating to many of our most basic traditions, institutions and social and psychological beliefs and practices.

The title of this paper alludes to what I have concluded could help us resolve this predicament. Considering our current strategic situation, I believe two quotes from past President Richard M. Nixon in The Real War are most prophetic:

One characteristic of advanced civilization is that as they grow richer and fatter, they become softer and more vulnerable. Throughout history the leading civilizations of their time have been destroyed by barbarians, not because they lacked wealth or arms, but because they lacked will; because they awoke too late to the threat, and reacted too timidly in devising a strategy to meet it.¹

In the final analysis victory will go to the side that most effectively builds, maintains, concert, and uses its power--not just its military power, but all its strengths combined . . . Power is the ability to make things happen, to influence events, to set the course of history. Some kinds of power operate effectively in the short term; some only over the course of many generations . . . Traditionally, the Chinese think in terms of millenia, the Russians in terms of centuries, the Europeans in terms of generations, and we Americans in terms of decades. We must learn to take a longer view. Then we will be more likely to take the actions in the short term that are necessary to achieve the results we want in the long term.²

It is important to emphasize that the concept of strategy herein advocated is a "grand" vs. "military" strategy. The latter form of strategy such as is articulated in DOD Defense Guidance or by the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the Congress would be an important part of a grand strategy addressing our military element of national power. Our military strategy per se, however, needs to be integrated within a greater strategic framework encompassing all United States elements of national power. I have accordingly concluded that a comprehensive grand strategy, one which integrates employment of all national elements of power and which focuses on the long term, could greatly help us meet the many free world leadership challenges we face. Importantly, such a strategy would have to require non-partisan support, be understood and supported by the American people, and in general terms endure over a span of several administrations and Congresses. To be lasting such a strategy would have to be "American" in nature and take into consideration our many unique characteristics, values, traditions, practices, etc.

I fully realize that the development and application of such a grand strategy is a tall order and would require the highest levels of sustained commitment and a considerable amount of time to develop and implement. I would be less than honest if I pretended I could prescribe all the details of

"how" we could develop or implement such a comprehensive strategy. Nevertheless, I do believe there is value in attempting to outline the problem and in suggesting a theoretical framework such a strategy might require. Whether we can accomplish the actual development of such a grand strategy or not--it is clear that there is a critical need for such a framework to guide our future policies and actions. If we fail to come to grips and adequately deal with this problem, we will continue to repeat our past up and down patterns of defense preparedness and gradually but surely fall further behind in the global strategic power struggle.

It is, as I earlier indicated, from within such a strategic framework that we would have our best chance of applying past industrial mobilization lessons learned and of being able to do so at minimum cost and with maximum long term effectiveness. The present realities of Soviet military power are forcing us to improve our conventional defense capabilities. Credible industrial mobilization preparedness planning has accordingly taken on increased deterrent value in and of itself and is now essential to our ability to prevail against the Soviets should deterrence fail.

The challenges we face demand a degree of strategic thinking and sophistication, mature leadership and both national and collective resolve and coordinated action not previously achieved or required. The future of our nation (and of the free world) and the democratic principles and liberties we so deeply cherish depend upon how well we meet these growing challenges over an extended period. "Both because of the size of the (relative) decline in our internal capabilities and of the threat facing us, America now has its greatest challenge in history."³

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF MODERN STRATEGY

The first logical step in attempting to outline what might be a proper grand strategic framework for the United States is to review what respected observers of the subject have written about it. One of the more comprehensive definitions and discussions of modern strategy was written by Edward Mead Earle during the midst of World War II in his introduction to the Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. The essence of his thoughts are found in the following excerpts from this work:

When war comes it dominates our lives . . . But war is not an act of God. It grows directly out of things which individuals, statesmen, and nations do or fail to do. It is, in short, the consequences of national policies or lack of policies.

A national strategy must be formulated by the President and the General Staff and implemented by acts of Congress, for in such matters the nation cannot be turned into a debating society. However, the strategy determined upon can succeed only if it has the support of enlightened and determined citizens . . . We believe that eternal vigilance in such matters (the causes of war and the fundamental principles which govern the conduct of war) is the price of liberty. We believe, too, that if we are to have a durable peace we must have a clear understanding of the role which armed forces play in international society.

Strategy deals with war, preparation for war, and the waging of war . . . But as war and society have become more complicated--and war, it must be remembered, is an inherent part of society--strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of nonmilitary factors, economics, psychological, moral, political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times . . . In the present day world, then, strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation--or a coalition of nations including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy--sometimes called grand strategy--is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.

.... The national factors in strategy frequently are the determining factors. In part they grow out of differences in the character and psychology of peoples, as well as their standards of value and their outlook on life In part they are the consequences of political, social, and economic institutions. Even more they are the political and military expression of geographical situation and national tradition Diplomacy and strategy, political commitments and military power, are inseparable; unless this be recognized, foreign policy will be bankrupt The very existence of a nation depends upon its concept of national interest and the means by which the national interest is promoted; therefore, it is imperative that its citizens understand the fundamentals of strategy It was a great democrat, Thomas Jefferson, who proposed that military affairs be made a fundamental part of American education (and in modern times, one would expect him to expand this requirement to encompass the concept of grand strategy)⁴ (emphasis added).

The parts from Earle which I want to emphasize are that: wars are caused by a nation's policies or lack of policies; such policies must be made by the President and staff, but can only succeed if they have the support of Congress and enlightened and determined citizens; that strategy now requires increasing considerations of nonmilitary factors such as a nation's economic, psychological, moral, political, and technological elements of power. He further recognizes that such a strategy must take into consideration a nation's unique characteristics and other national factors.

Charles Burton Marshall elaborates upon the critical factors in Earle's discussion of a nation's grand strategy--its vital interests and its means and national will to protect and promote them:

Earle's reference to "vital interests" calls for elucidation, for the phrase lies at the center of problems of peace and war and the precept of coherence in policy The issue involved in classifying an interest as a vital interest . . . hinges on will and on calculation of means. The test of resolution is willingness and ability to pay the entailed price. . . . Mutual contradiction between interests deemed vital by decision-makers on the respective sides is what undoes peace and induces war. War breaks down and peace is enabled to resume upon renunciation by one side or the other--whether due to faltering will or failing means or both in combination--of interests once deemed to require being fought for.

.... A strategy may fail without being tested in war, however. That happens when want of means forecloses an organized society from classifying disputed interests as vital and forces it to yield, without fighting, what it would have fought over if it could . . . The essence of prevailing in war, if forstalling efforts fail, is also in identifying correctly one's vital interests and in having the will and commanding the means to uphold them.⁵

We can gather from the above discussion, that a nation must first carefully establish what it considers to be its "vital interests" and that these interests must be clearly understood by all concerned. The United States has adequately accomplished this. A recent such announcement was made by President Carter concerning the Middle East and Persian Gulf oil following the Soviets' move into Afghanistan. What is most important, however, is to have the "means" and "national will" to make credible such a declaration--for such an utterance by an American president is an indication that we will fight to protect such national interest if necessary. In the latter two departments the United States, as we've already indicated, has a mixed record. It was not, for instance in this situation until after the President's declaration that we started creating the RDJTF and as we all know, the Reagan Administration has spent more than two years trying to rearm America. Sustaining national will is a particularly troubling problem for the United States, as it is for our democratic friends and allies. In the past the United States has not rallied to the flag until a clear and significant threat was perceived. In World War II this took the catalytic event of an attack on Pearl Harbor and in the early 1950s it took the Soviets' development of an atomic weapon and North Korea's invasion of South Korea. As we all know, our public will lapsed as the Korean and Vietnam conflicts extended over time. Largely as a result of the public backlash over this phenomena, the United States lost its military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The Reagan Administration came into office with what appeared to be a strong mandate from the American people to restore our military balance of power. It is already evident, however, that this popular resolve has already weakened, partially as a result of the passage of time, largely as a result of economic recession, but also due to a lack of consensus and bipartisan support from many influential elements among our elite or leadership class (e.g., the February 1983 McNamara, Bundy, Vance and Zumwalt letter to Congress recommending deletion of \$190 billion of the President's FYDP, to include the MX, B-1 and three aircraft carriers). As Marshall correctly indicated, without adequate means to include a nation's will a nation's strategy may fail without fighting. As I have already indicated, it is my firm belief that a properly developed and executed grand strategy would go a long way toward providing the needed consistency of policy and toward developing the enduring public support it would require.

Potential components for a United States grand strategy are not difficult to come by. A primary strength of the United States is its economic power. It is certainly one of the most important requisites to maintaining our global military strength, and to the conduct of our foreign policy. High levels of employment are also dependent upon a strong economy which, further, is important to maintaining the requisite national will to support our strategies. Much U.S. industry is losing out to foreign competition. To the degree that this competition is directly supported by foreign governments and to the degree that we need certain capabilities for essential military mobilization preparedness, our government should have policies and take steps to insure our economic interests are protected and that U.S. corporations can

compete with their foreign counterparts on an even basis. Such strategic economic policies would not need to be "protectionist" policies. They could include, as an example, such actions as increased federal support for basic and applied research to help us maintain our technological superiority, faster rates of depreciation to encourage capital investment, a relaxing of anti-trust laws to encourage cooperation and to limit redundant and costly duplication of effort (e.g., in R&D). This is but one example; many other economic related examples could be offered. On the psychological level, we need to counter Soviet propaganda in Western Europe, Japan and throughout much of the rest of the world. President Reagan's proposed "centers for democracy," the Voice of America, and similar programs would appear to be potential candidates for integration into a U.S. grand strategy. Another consideration might be to establish similar public information programs to help us keep the American people better informed. Maybe even Thomas Jefferson's recommendation (as quoted from Earle above) of mandatory military affairs studies at the high school and university levels is not such a bad idea for developing a broader strategic understanding and informed citizenry.

CHAPTER III

NSC-68-A HISTORICAL PRECEDENT?

The United States has never developed what could be considered a true grand strategy as defined by Earle. Yet, there is one U.S. document which might come close. "In 1950, prompted by the Soviet Union's arrival as a nuclear power the year before, the U.S. Government for the first time ever under formal conditions of peace, put together a strategy in a document indexed as NSC-68 (U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security), possibly the most important U.S. Government study ever undertaken."⁶ (emphasis added)

The immediate reason NSC-68 was developed is that it was one of several:

"US Government responses to the intelligence that the Soviet Union had probably achieved a successful nuclear explosion in August 1949. President Truman directed that a State-Defense study team be formed to provide background information and guidance on nuclear weapons policy, . . . The study team actually did more than it had been directed to do. It undertook to provide a persuasive base that would complete the Truman Administration reversal of its postwar policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, and corresponding peacetime defense expenditures, to the policy of confrontation and rearmament, as the requisite of eventual negotiations on acceptable terms . . ."⁹

Although this document was never officially approved, (it is believed the North Korean invasion of South Korea was sufficient to jell American public opinion and, therefore, obviate the need for NSC-68 to develop the public consensus intended by its authors), its content nevertheless influenced much of our strategic thinking from 1950 through the Vietnam era. It was a proactive strategy and included employment of U.S. economic, psychological, moral and military elements of power. We find many of the concepts within

NSC-68 similar to those described by Earle as applying to a grand strategy. We also find the Soviet threat and their hegemonic intentions well documented and one can only conclude from review of this document that American leaders were well aware of and clearly forewarned regarding the grand strategy of Soviet leaders and of their growing capabilities vis-a-vis our own. The U.S., as a result of this study and the subsequent North Korean invasion of the South (which was considered a likely diversion for a Soviet drive into Western Europe), expended tremendous effort and resources in an attempt to "foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system." Largely as a result of this threat and Soviet intentions documented in NSC-68, the U.S. undertook its last major and highly successful industrial mobilization. It might be conjectured that this mobilization deterred further Soviet aggression. It might also be conjectured that that lesson to the Soviets, wherein we committed approximately fifty percent of our Federal budget to war preparations, is still remembered hence adds to the potential deterrent value a credible industrial mobilization plan could provide today. In retrospect, as I later quote Edward N. Luttwak, we now know that the Soviets were nowhere near as militarily strong then as we thought they were--we further know that this is no longer the case today. We also know that we did not accomplish the principle objective of fundamentally changing the Soviet system from within.

Background

Before reviewing important excerpts from NSC-68, it will be helpful to first place its undertaking in proper historical perspective. Within the "previous thirty-five years the world (had) experienced two global wars . . . (and) two revolutions . . . the Russian and the Chinese . . . It (had) also seen the collapse of five empires . . . the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese . . . and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power (had) been fundamentally altered (within which) a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, (and) over which no state was able to achieve hegemony."⁷ World War II, from which the U.S. emerged the only overwhelming economic and military power in the world, had ended just five years earlier. British historian Robert Payne adequately described America's power at that time, "America bestrides the world like a Colossus; no other power at any time in the world's history has possessed so varied or so great an influence on other nations . . . One-half the wealth of the world, more than half the productivity, nearly two-thirds of the world's machines are concentrated in American hands; the rest of the world lies in the shadow of American industry. (and Marshall adds) U.S. resources included unchallenged ascendancy in military aviation and in naval power over every ocean and a long headstart in nuclear technology providing strategic leverage susceptible to being brought to bear in deterring military initiatives at lesser levels of force."⁸ As a result of this overwhelming power, the United States assumed unchallenged leadership of the free world. Based upon Soviet hegemonic behavior

shortly before and following the close of World War II, the "Cold War" had already started. The U.S. had launched its "containment" strategy through the European Recovery Program to rebuild Europe economically and the Point IV and other assistance programs to help other important countries. A year earlier the Soviets had developed the atom bomb and we expected them to develop a thermonuclear weapon in the immediate future. The U.S. by this time had unilaterally dismantled most of the conventional warmaking capability it had amassed during World War II and had not developed a thermonuclear weapon of its own.

See appendix A for pertinent extracts from the NSC-68 document.

CHAPTER IV

TODAY'S THREAT

A general review of the current Soviet threat to the fundamental purpose and objectives of the United States and the free world should provide us the basis of determining how well we have faired strategically since NSC-68 was written thirty-three years ago. Economically, "The Soviets have been closing the gap. Soviet GNP in 1955 was 40% of ours; by 1965 it was half ours; today (1980) Soviet GNP is about 60% of U.S. GNP. (But) these aggregate differences in GNP conceal important details. First, in the U.S. about 70% of output goes to consumption; in the Soviet Union just over 30% is consumed. Second, the Soviets have allocated 30% of their output to investment while investment in the U.S. uses only 15 to 17% of GNP Finally, the U.S. devotes a much smaller share of its total output to defense--5% versus about 15% for the Soviet Union."¹⁰

Senator Sam Nunn adds that, "Since 1970 the Soviet Union has invested a total of \$104 billion more than the U.S. in military equipment and facilities and \$40 billion more in research and development. Soviet foreign policy, invigorated by this relentless military build up and the uncertain American response to it, is seeking to gain a stranglehold over the economic foundations of Western prosperity and military power."¹¹ (emphasis added) Congressman Ichord goes on to indicate that, "no one has the clairvoyance to predict the requirements, characteristics or duration of the next war. However, the massive Soviet force structure and the quantitative advantage the Soviets hold over the United States--18 to 1 in surface-to-air missiles, 11.5

to 1 in armored vehicles and artillery pieces, 2 to 1 in tactical aircraft, naval surface combatant ships and submarines--makes the ability to surge production extremely important."¹²

Senator Tower aptly explains that, "since 1962, Soviet military capability has grown inexorably. This growth, uninfluenced by fluctuation in U.S. defense spending, has provided the Soviets with both a margin of strategic superiority and a broad range of conventional superiority. Even today (given this superiority) for every 600 tanks we build, they build 3,000. For every 300 fighter aircraft we produce, they produce 1,300. And for every two or three submarines we launch each year, they launch between 9 and 12."¹³

Admiral Zumwalt discussing Soviet strategic goals gives us a good perspective of Soviet strategy. He explains that,

"The Soviet drive for dominance can be seen clearly in Asia and Africa. Sometimes Soviet activism in these areas seem piecemeal and opportunistic. This appearance should not distract our attention from the brilliance of that very strategy--probing on many fronts with prompt exploitation of opportunities thus revealed. The result is a determined and long term effort to reduce our ability and our will to resist Soviet expansion. The immediate focus is on the Persian Gulf, long a traditional Soviet interest and a prize of immense value in the East-West competition. The Soviets see success here as the best way to achieve their overriding strategic goal of Finlandization of NATO. The next most important Soviet goals seem to be (1) to deny the West's access to the resources of Southern Africa, (2) to achieve a significant foothold in South America . . . Though the Soviets proximate goals are in the Third World, their ultimate goal is the subjugation of the free world. They aim to achieve this by threatening our access to raw materials and breaking down our alliance. They have vast military capabilities, but they threaten us more by indirect and subversion than by direct attack. Consequently, the political effects of the changing military balance become of paramount importance."¹⁴

As past President Nixon further reminds us, "The Soviet goal remains what it has been; to win without war if possible, with war if necessary. Victory for the West does not necessarily mean victory in war. But victory without

war requires us to be strong enough to prevent the Soviets from winning either with war or without it."¹⁵ He further cautions that, "Communist regimes have taken power not only in Eastern Europe, but also in China, North Korea, all of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, Mozambique, and Cuba. So far no country that has come completely under Communist control has escaped from that control."¹⁶

This rough sketch of the current Soviet threat is sufficiently convincing to concern most of us. What should alarm us, however, is its general trend and relative increase over that outlined by NSC-68 in 1950. It should be obvious from this discussion that our past efforts have not changed the fundamental nature of the Soviet system or of its strategic design as recommended in NSC-68. Far from it! The Soviets now control considerably more territory than in 1950. They continue to steadily improve their economy and most significantly, they overcame U.S. nuclear superiority while simultaneously adding qualitatively to the superiority of their conventional forces. In short, the reality is they are now a far greater threat to be reckoned with than they were when NSC-68 was developed in 1950.

CHAPTER V

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS AFFECTING AMERICAN STRATEGIC THOUGHT

CHANGED BALANCE OF POWER

As discussed in the introduction, the changing balance of power is a major factor strategically impacting the United States. We have already documented increasing Soviet economic and military power relative to our own. They now have significant global capabilities. Their threat to us is not in relation to "potential" power, for the West in aggregate will continue to tower over the Warsaw Pact, but rather to their in-being mobilized military strength, the perception of others of that power, their "will" to use it and the political clout it gives them.

There is also the other significant aspect to our changing balance of power, that of the U.S. ability to "lead" the free world. The potential impact of this factor is increased by the fact that our allies are also free democracies with pluralistic societies and market economies all of which are subject to the "will" of their citizens. The fact that these nations are also located along the periphery of the Soviet empire further adds to the Kremlin's potential influence upon the "national will" of these smaller Western nations and Japan and the difficulty of our own efforts to counter this influence. The massive Soviet military build up over the last 15-20 years and the loss of U.S. nuclear weapon superiority have lessened many of these states' perception of U.S. backed security which in turn increases their perception of Soviet power relative to our own. Although our alliances are still solid and are expected to remain so, we must realize that our relations with them have reached a maturity level which demands more consultation and coordination than

previously required. In short, all of the problems associated with maintaining our own military strength, a consistent foreign policy based upon "vital U.S. interests," and the requisite "national will" to support both are greatly magnified when a group of similar democracies are involved. These considerations place a premium upon consistent U.S. long term policies which can best be implemented within the blueprint of a comprehensive "grand" strategy and by steady, consistent, and resolute American leadership.

AMERICAN CHARACTER, WILL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

President Nixon highlighted in The Real War several key problems which tend to inhibit American strategic thinking and our ability over time to maintain consistent strategic policies and programs. He cautions that, "Americans are unaccustomed to thinking in global terms, and uncomfortable with the exercise of power unless directly provoked, as we were at Pearl Harbor"¹⁷ (and again by the North Korean invasion). And further points to our natural inclination of concentrating on peace loving endeavors. He explains that, "From George Washington's Neutrality Proclamation through the Monroe Doctrine and the Marshall Plan runs an American impulse that disdains war and instead seeks to spread freedom and prosperity. These instincts make for a constructive foreign policy . . . if we also show the resolve required of a great power . . . and there, precisely in that 'if', lies our greatest potential weakness, and the greatest danger to the West."¹⁸ A central theme throughout his book (as it was in NSC-68 and in Earle's work) is the importance of national willpower. He explains that, "national will involves far more than readiness to use military power . . . it includes a readiness to

allocate the resources necessary to maintain that power. (and charges that), America's failure of will in recent years have been partly the product of weariness after forty years of bearing the burdens of world leadership. They clearly result in part from the traumas of Vietnam and Watergate. But more fundamentally, they reflect the failures of America's leadership class. . . what has to be done is to wake those who exercise leadership to the responsibilities of leadership."¹⁹ To reinforce this point he quotes Alexander Solzhenitsyn who, "pointed to a decline in courage as the most striking feature of the West (and that) such a decline in courage is particularly noticeable among the ruling groups and the intellectual elite, causing an impression of loss of courage by the entire society," (and Solzhenitsyn further admonished that), no weapons, no matter how powerful, can help the West until it overcomes its loss of will power . . ."²⁰ Nixon recognizes the differences and difficulties between the U.S. (and free world) and Soviet systems and cautions that, "The strength of Soviet totalitarianism is that the government can concert its efforts in every field: military, economic, scientific, education. A pluralistic free society cannot do this. Most of its economic decisions are made in the marketplace, its education system goes its own way, its press is free . . . as a result of our different systems, marshalling the nations will is a more difficult task in the West. But it is also more important . . . Soviet leaders command. Western leaders must lead."²¹ He concludes that " . . . America and the West need to be jolted into a sense of urgency. We no longer have the margin of error that we had even a few short years ago. That margin vanished with our advantage in strategic weapons."²²

INCREASING ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Most concern expressed regarding increasing international economic interdependence revolves around the issues associated with our dependence upon foreign sources for critical raw materials, subassemblies assembled overseas and general concerns regarding a decrease in U.S. basic industries. These are valid concerns and worthy of our attention, but there are also other significant aspects of our increasing economic interdependence which can affect our economic viability, military strength and U.S. free world leadership --the fact that our market economy has become significantly intertwined with those of our principal allies. We are highly dependent upon competitive trade with one another and to a large degree for exports to and imports from Third World nations, to include some with the Communist bloc. Economic activity is the life blood of our democratic societies and we all practice laissez-faire competition and trade restrictions to varying degrees.

Politics within democratic governments are to a large degree driven by the health of their economies and, increasingly, by each others economies. High unemployment, high inflation, high interest rates or deep recessions within the U.S. increasingly affect our trading partners and vice versa. Trade barriers encounter counter barriers and political responses. Shortages of critical resources, such as we experienced during the oil embargo, can cause dependent states to consider their own "vital interests" over the needs of their trading partners and alliance requirements, e.g., restriction of landing and overflight rights. The point is, although such economic interdependence has served us well, and especially when the U.S. was so economically strong compared to the others, it also contains the seeds of divisiveness within our

security alliances. One fact is certain, the U.S. will no longer have the degree of unilateral freedom of action it enjoyed during most of the post World War II era. This consideration must also be factored into the need for consistent long term U.S. policy and a comprehensive grand strategy integrating all elements of power and it further puts a premium on the astuteness and consistency of future American leadership. An article in the Washington Post recently highlighted this situation in response to Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's declaration of "a time of trial for Washington-Tokyo ties." It commented that, "The immediate cause is the U.S. economic distress that has reduced the tolerance for disadvantages and burdens and has created a sense that the outside world, especially Japan, is unfair. (However beneath the surface are deeper strains. Economic and military relationships in the world have changed greatly since the time when the U.S. was preeminent, but patterns of thought and action have not fully adjusted. Japan is now second only to the United States as a free market industrial nation . . . (and) no longer a U.S. understudy, it is increasingly a competitor."²³ (emphasis added)

INCREASING INFLUENCE OF "SPECIAL INTEREST" GROUPS

We have already compared many significant differences between the ability of a totalitarian government to rule, direct priorities and to influence national will relative to that of free democracies with market economies. There are other significant forces which particularly affect democratic governments and some of them appear to be on the increase. Klaus Knorr in Economic Issues and National Security discusses many of the more significant ones.

He prophetically indicates that,

"national will tends to be weaker when the more influential groups are divided on the use of national resources and are motivated by a priorities structure that favors withholding resources from all national programs (or) favors those that compete with national security action . . . (and that) national will also tends to be weak when influentials are divided on the nature of specific courses of action because of differences in threat perception or different expectations on the various pros and cons of particular programs. (He further believes that the increases in the number and political power of special interest groups add to this problem.) . . . Population segments previously more or less underprivileged in terms of influence on government--ethnic and religious minorities, women, and youths--have gained more political influence in exerting their rights and making public welfare claims. At the same time, labor unions and farmers associations have become strengthened vis-a-vis employers and are using their power more readily to defend or increase the economic welfare of their members. . . . These developments in the cultural and political infrastructure have entailed three important consequences. First, economic problems, both domestic and international, have become more widely politicized than before and have apparently risen in salience relative to other national programs . . . Second, the increased ability of various interest groups . . . to advance their preferences and their greater willingness to do so with other groups . . . has tended to enfeeble government authority and weaken the great political parties in these societies . . . Third, these interest groups are making increasingly effective demands on the state for new or larger public benefits."²⁴ (emphasis added)

AMERICA'S "ALL VOLUNTEER" MILITARY

The last "significant" factor impacting America's strategic challenge I intend to discuss, is that of our All Volunteer Force (AVF). Much has been written concerning the pros and cons of the quality and military effectiveness of the AVF. Although these are important considerations, they are not the focus of this discussion. Rather, I want to address the potential impact it may have upon future American leadership and upon our nation's popular will. Political leadership and national will, repeatedly discussed above, are key interlocking factors responsible more than most for our nation's behavior and survival. To many observers, they have become increasing problems in

governing and guiding America today. These "leaders" are a broad group of American opinion influencers and decisionmakers. They start with the President and the executive, judicial and legislative branches of our federal government; but also include our state and local government leaders and leaders in the academia, professions, business, labor unions, churches, media and other "elites" within our society. A factor perhaps little understood nationally, is that our previous military draft provided our civilian leaders a national security perspective they are not now getting. For the last ten years, the AVF has come primarily from the more disadvantaged elements of our society rather than from the pool of youth from which most of our future leaders will emerge. A Brookings Institute study recently pointed out that up to 75 percent of U.S. eligible males had military service from World War II until the end of the draft in 1973 (many in the Reserve Component) and today that only 16 percent of our eligible males gain this experience. Within this 16 percent, however, only 14 percent of eligible whites have served and these come primarily from the lower income sectors of our society. To show the significance of these statistics, a recent lecturer at the Industrial College indicated that in his talks with Congressional staffers he notes a significant difference in the perspective of those who have served and those who have not. The representativeness of these figures are readily discernible in the makeup of the 98th Congress, where an extremely small number of its members have served in the Armed Forces since the Vietnam conflict. We should expect that a similar representativeness prevails and is generally increasing throughout America's leadership ranks. The decisions on rearming America and our continued strategic power struggle with the Soviet Union rests principally

in their hands. Their influence upon our national will is great, far out of proportion to their numbers compared to the American population as a whole. So long as we continue with the AVF, we should expect this lessened national security perspective amongst our national leaders to have increasing influence upon the way we deal with national security issues as a nation.

CHAPTER VI

CRITIQUES OF PAST AMERICAN STRATEGIES AND STRATEGIC THOUGHT

Charles Burton Marshall, W. Scott Thompson and Edward N. Luttwak offer criticism of past American strategic thought which provides further insight into the problems we currently have in thinking and acting strategically. Marshall concentrates on the persistent tendency throughout American history to "ignore" war and many of the historical lessons of mankind and international behavior of nation-states while concentrating on "peace" as representing the more normal state of mankind. He also believes that such lofty thinking may be a key factor explaining the manner in which we develop and implement our strategies and the basis for much of our foreign policy. This is a rather subtle point and one that could easily be overlooked or misunderstood. Marshall explains that throughout our history,

"Wars were (seen as) interruptions. Any need for thinking how to win them could wait upon their event . . . the way to prevent them was to encourage cooperation, communications, commerce, and the like, to center attention and energy on peaceful pursuits as distinguished from the arts of war . . . However implausible . . . (this) notion of a non-strategic basis for peace has proved durable. It not only survived but indeed thrived upon the twentieth centuries' two world wars. Each of those wars in turn was portrayed by U.S. leadership as the one last interruption--with perpetual peace to follow. Materializing that dream became the paramount end of U.S. policy in both wars. The core idea of the League of Nations Covenant of 1919 and the U.N. Charter of 1945 is that every signatory nation forswear belligerent initiatives . . . The ultimate goal of strategy was perceived as a situation putting an end to all need of strategy."²⁵

Marshall further reinforces this important point by quoting a foreign source who stated that, "as a strategic competitor, the U.S. is handicapped by its remembered past; its commitment to a strategic approach to upholding peace on acceptable terms accordingly has been--and persists in being--too contingent and too much affected by vain hopes. In contemplating the relevance of this view, he believes, one must distinguish between experience (with war and peace) and assumptions (toward the nature of mankind and requirements for enduring peace) . . . American experience concerning war--and therefore strategy and the prevailing American perspective on that experience have long been at variance with each other and perhaps remains so."²⁶

As Nixon pointed out, Americans have disdained war and have sought freedom and prosperity throughout our history. Largely as a result of this psyche we have normally been unready for wars we have been unable to avoid and rapidly disarmed as soon as they were over. We may have survived following this practice before the burden of free world leadership was thrust upon us, however, we must now seriously ask ourselves whether such "wishful" thinking will continue to support us as a major power confronted by a highly armed totalitarian regime antithetical to our own form of government and position of world power? A closer scrutiny of NSC-68 discloses what could be interpreted as a preoccupation of winning over the thinking and basic design of Soviet leaders to positions akin to our own desires for a brotherhood of nations living together in world peace as envisioned by the U.N. Charter. However, desirable world peace is to our way of life as a nation, it appears to be, as Marshall noted, a non-strategic basis for maintaining peace. Rather, the

proper strategic basis for peace appears to be centered more around a proper identification of our nation's "vital interest" and an adequate calculation and maintenance of the means, to include national will and military strength, to secure them such that the resort to war is either unnecessary or undertaken with maximum chance of winning.

Thompson expands further upon this point by indicating that

"There is a wide spread view in Washington and elsewhere that the United States and the USSR have the same interest in preserving peace. But this view represents a fundamental, critical misunderstanding . . . On the one hand Americans . . . assume that others have noble intentions and share our vision . . . especially our commitment to a world that tolerates diversity. In this view, peace will result in improved communication and trust . . . (However) The Soviets' view is the very opposite . . . (in their view), peace is obstructed by intrinsic flaws in our system and in us, and therefore peace can only come when they have reformed us, changed us fundamentally. Their commitment to this is all the more compelling when it is seen as the instrument and fulfillment of historical necessity. Peace in the American sense, is thus not a natural state, while conflict is inherent to the Soviet view of historical process. Nor does our view of peace find much support in history . . . In practice, our nonstrategic view of peace has been redeemed only in recent years by retreat . . . peace through retreat only encourages more aggression . . . A strategic concept of peace maintains a clear definition of interests . . . national interests involves some calculus of cost and benefits . . . which as an important element, must also include judgement of national will."²⁷

Luttwak provides us yet another perspective which is based upon more pragmatic considerations, which should help us better understand America's strategic dilemma. He reminds us that, "as a nation, Americans are pragmatic problem solvers rather than systematic or long-range thinkers . . . Strategy by contrast is the one practical pursuit that requires a contrary method: to connect the diverse issues into a systematic pattern of things; then to craft plans--often long range--for dealing with the whole. In the life of this

nation it has not been strategy but rather pragmatic problem solving that has created a society wealthier than most . . . That is why it is now so very difficult for Americans to accept the ineluctable fact that to achieve even moderate success the nation's external policy must be guided by the alien rules of strategy."²⁸

Luttwak goes on to discuss the historical setting preceding our elevation to world power status, and then renders a rather critical assessment of our strategic performances since that time. His comments reinforces Thompson's suggestion of a U.S. "retreat" in our strategic conflict with the Soviets. He explains

"that until the beginning of this century it was the power of Great Britain, a nation then itself exquisitely strategical, that secured for the Americans all they really needed of the outside world . . . the Americans had the Great Powers balanced for them and kept from their door . . . Even after 1945 the Americans needed no strategy merely to keep on an even keel. There was an economy so powerful . . . resources so abundant . . . war industries so amply productive . . . (and) on top of all there was the nuclear weapon . . . and so it was that the simplest of strategies, 'containment', could be triumphantly successful. Europe, Japan, and their appendages duly recovered . . . safe behind the shield of American power. The task was made easier . . . by the great weakness of the Soviet Union. Behind Stalin's six million men in arms there was a desert of war destruction . . . (their best kept secret was that) Stalin did not have the strength to keep the large part of Europe that Russian arms had won. With 'containment' the Americans pursued what the British had once pursued for them--until Vietnam. Then it was not only the wisdom of policy that broke down . . . not only the competent pursuit of war that collapsed . . . It was the very notion of strategy that waned, even that largely passive strategy of containment which required merely that we react . . . even after that defeat, Americans could nevertheless think that the discipline of strategy remained unnecessary. There was still a slim margin in our favor in the 'strategic-nuclear' balance . . . , and even if all who desired could easily project the advent of unambiguous inferiority in the 1980s, most could still imagine that all was well . . . and by then we had the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), whereby . . . the great strength accumulated by the steady effort of the Russians would be negated, at low cost and at no risk, through the drafting of legal documents. In this atmosphere it was an easy matter for the instrument--arms control--to displace the purpose, for only a national strategy could define the purpose and we had no national strategy."²⁹ (emphasis added)

CHAPTER VII

RELATING AN ENDURING STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK TO LASTING INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS PLANNING

Initially I observed that most relevant lessons from past American industrial mobilizations have been well documented. Equally obvious was the fact that we had not followed these lessons and that today, in the face of a massive Soviet military buildup, we are again ill prepared to rapidly transform this nation's industrial strength into actual warfighting capabilities.

As we have discussed, there are several historical forces which explain why the United States has not been able to maintain consistent defense preparedness in the past and why it will be most difficult for us to achieve desired consistency in the future. Hopefully, as I have tried to argue, a comprehensive grand strategy could help us meet the many serious challenges we face. Ideally, and hopefully realizable, such a strategic framework would enhance our ability to stride a more steady pace and united course over the long term when it comes to our fundamental national security and free world leadership needs. Within such a strategic framework, and considering historical precedent probably only if we can attain one, we would be more able to develop and sustain adequate planning for industrial mobilization preparedness in peacetime.

The emphasis herein is intentionally on planning for total industrial mobilization vs. investing in standby industrial capabilities. Unfortunately, in our current efforts to "rearm America" it does not appear that we have reached this level of planning. Roderick Vawter, following experience as an Army planner concluded that:

" . . . DOD (does) not accomplish mobilization planning for the economy as a whole. We do not plan for a conversion of the whole economy to the production of war goods. We do not plan for materiel requirements for other than the (program) force (a force restrained by peacetime dollar constraints). We do not realistically consider the total industrial might of this country in any of our military planning. Nowhere in our planning do we provide for the conversion of our industrial giants such as General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler to produce military goods--lock, stock, and barrel. Carrying it a step further, the Federal Government, except for isolated actions such as the national strategic material stockpile, does not do mobilization planning (he further concludes that he believes) the concept of industrial preparedness has tended to center on the idea of acquisition and retention of excess, idle capacity (excess to peacetime production which can be rapidly turned on upon mobilization. This has become a problem because this approach is very expensive.) . . . the key . . . is that we plan on how we will do it (convert peacetime commercial capacity) during mobilization. No initial investment is required except for what should be minimal funding for expanded planning."³⁰ (emphasis added)

This distinction between planning vs. investing in standby capabilities is important to the strategic framework recommended. First, we must recognize that in the past we have not been able to maintain a high level of "in being" mobilization preparedness. Second, as earlier noted, credible industrial mobilization planning offers a high level of deterrent value (to be discussed below). By realizing the importance of this deterrent value and by pursuing an "affordable" approach, it should also be an approach we can support over the long term. Third, if we conduct realistic total mobilization planning and maintain it, we will be in a far better position to rapidly muster our industrial potential should deterrence fail. A proper strategic framework is required to rationalize this need and to develop and sustain the national support necessary to maintain it over the long term.

Futurist and strategic analyst Herman Kahn in The Coming Boom correctly emphasizes the strategically important deterrent value to be obtained from lasting and credible mobilization plans. He advises that:

"There is deterrence value in any credible American resistance, especially if it is clear up front . . . (that major enemy actions) might well lead to a declaration of war and/or a full scale mobilization of at least the magnitude that occurred during the Korean War. 'In June, 1950, Congress was debating whether the defense budget should be increased from 13 to . . . 16 billion. Then North Korea invaded South Korea, and Congress gave the Department of Defense . . . \$60 billion' . . . The example of the Korean War mobilization is useful to explain that there is potential for a large and rapid increase in defense spending. Similarly, any mobilization following a crisis in (for example) the Persian Gulf would be as likely to be triggered by concern for . . . Soviet threat to (other) U.S. vital interests as by the specific consequences of the attack itself. A U.S. defense budget of between \$500 billion and \$1 trillion--or more is possible under those circumstances. Indeed, Defense Secretary Weinberger has recently suggested we should have plans to mobilize half the GNP--i.e., \$1.5 trillion . . . The consequences of such a mobilization would be uncomfortable for the United States but disastrous from the Soviet point of view . . . Along with the increased 'warfighting' capability would go increased bargaining power so that the United States could hope to achieve its objectives without fighting. (from his footnote) Fear of such mobilization is probably a greater deterrent to massive Soviet provocation than existing strategic forces . . . (The Soviets) are . . . completely aware of the danger of provoking the United States into doubling, tripling or quadrupling its own military budget. Further, if before provocation the United States openly spent billions of dollars to prepare for mobilization after such provocation, the deterrent to the Soviets would be even greater."³¹

Unfortunately, the real deterrent value of credible and realistic total mobilization preparedness planning is little realized in this nation. Also little understood is the difference between planning and investing and the associated difference in dollars and time required to acquire the easily achievable deterrent value it offers. Not only are DOD and the Federal Government not doing total mobilization planning, and largely as a result thereof, neither is the other important player, "American Industry." Again, in my judgement, one of the biggest problems as to why we are not accomplishing

such sustained planning on a priority basis is that we lack proper appreciation for its importance and the strategic framework within which to rationalize its need and to develop and maintain the requisite national support for such a vital and cost effective deterrence program.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The United States was catapulted into superpower status as a result of World War II. Out of the destruction of that global conflict, which followed the break up of the previous world order, the U.S. emerged as a colossal power vastly overshadowing her previous foes and allies alike. From this tremendous power base we assumed unquestioned leadership of the free world.

We used our vast economic resources to help rebuild Europe and Japan. We undertook this in our own self interest as well as in those of our benefactors. First, we had genuine humanitarian concerns, but perhaps more important was our motivation to reestablish a stable world order and to restore the economies of other major nations for trade purposes. Before the ashes of war had cooled, however, another reason became urgent--to limit Soviet hegemonism and the spread of international communism to the weakened states on the Russian periphery. American economic, political, psychological and military power were thus oriented toward a strategy of "containing" Soviet expansion and further toward efforts to fundamentally change the strategic design and intentions of her leaders. These strategic concepts and objectives were outlined in a joint State and Defense Department document, NSC-68 in April 1950. This document represents America's most comprehensive effort in the public record toward developing a "grand" strategy during a period of official peace. Although never formally adopted, its outline guided much of American strategic thinking through the Vietnam era.

"Containment" and the building of our alliances, as noted, were undertaken from a position of overwhelming American power. Historically we now know that Soviet capabilities at that time would not have supported her intentions if she had been challenged. The U.S. was in a position, not fully appreciated at the time, of being able to face down the Soviets during any serious confrontation. This latter fact was most obvious as late as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, during which the U.S. held a 15:1 nuclear weapon advantage³² and equally impressive air and naval power superiority over the Soviets. We should have taken seriously the pledge of Soviet leaders following that confrontation, of never letting such a facedown happen to them again. Since that time the Soviet Union has undertaken a steady but continuous buildup of her military power. They surpassed us in nuclear superiority sometime early in the 1970s. They now have their first, modern Blue Water Navy which continues to grow, an equally expanding air arm and large well equipped conventional ground forces. The U.S. (including our allies) have gone from a position of unquestioned superiority over the Soviet bloc to one facing a "window of vulnerability" in strategic nuclear weapons and of inferiority in tactical nuclear and conventional forces. In a major confrontation with the Soviet Union today, the U.S. no longer has the unquestioned upper hand, in fact, it is uncertain who could or would face whom down.

Many feel and justifiably so, that as a result of this fundamental change in the balance of power, the world is now a more dangerous place in which to live. In a condition of nuclear parity (or possibly worse) it is questionable whether either side would "go to the brink," hence the U.S. has lost much, if not all, of its nuclear "escalation control" advantage. This places

increasing emphasis upon the importance of conventional forces and, therefore, upon our capabilities to rapidly mobilize the potential industrial advantage the U.S. still has over the Soviet Union. Given this scenario, time becomes a critical factor in our ability to transform our potential industrial strength into actual warfighting capabilities. Given the relative decline of nuclear weapons as a deterrent force, it is now additionally an urgent deterrent requirement that we develop credible plans to rapidly transform American economic and industrial power into military power.

The most strategically important change in the world's balance of power since World War II has been the relative decline of United States "useable" military power compared to that of the Soviet Union's. We earlier discussed other relevant factors in the changing balance of power between the U.S. and our principle allies which increase the challenge to and problems facing U.S. free world leadership and the ability of the West to strategically counter Soviet military power and her undiminished thrust for expansion and world domination. The situation within the West is one of a maturing relationship, a more natural and potentially far more beneficial relationship for the West per se and in her power struggle with the Soviet bloc, but it is also one that calls for a more mature and consistent American leadership and, more than anything else, for a more comprehensive strategic framework within which to set our global objectives and to guide our actions. Such a strategy is also urgently required as the "cornerstone" from which to associate the capabilities of our own grand strategy with an even grander strategy which encompasses the capabilities of our principal allies.

CHAPTER IX

RECOMMENDATIONS

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Although understandably far easier to state than to apply, it nevertheless appears desirable to outline several fundamental ideas that, if implemented would help the United States deal more wisely and surely with the many strategic challenges we face as a nation and as leader of the free world. More than anything else, our past tells us that we need to pull together more effectively and more consistently as a people, both internally and in our external relations, on the key elements of power that comprise our basic strengths as a nation. It also appears necessary that we adopt a more realistic view of the world as a system of separate nation-states or groupings of such states and of the continuing historical struggle for power amongst them. It is within this latter context that we must accept a more realistic concept as the basis for and importance of power within the international community. And specifically, we must attempt to better understand and more realistically appreciate our foremost adversary, the Soviet Union, and perhaps accept her more for what she really is than for what we would prefer her to be.

Finally, it appears essential that we think and plan more effectively over a longer range of time. It is my considered judgement that if the United States is to have any chance of adopting these fundamental ideas, we most urgently need to develop a comprehensive modern "grand" strategy. It should be one designed on a strategic concept for maintaining the peace, and, should peace break down, one that would maximize our chances of survival as a free

nation. It should be one which attempts to better integrate and employ all U.S. elements of national power--economic, psychological, moral, political, and technical as well as military. And it should be one that takes into consideration the unique character, traditions, outlook on life and government processes of the American people. More important than anything else, it should be one based upon a careful selection and articulation of our "vital" national interests and an equally careful calculation of the "means" necessary to promote and protect those interests. Implementation of these ideas would mean that we must better understand and support the necessary role of military power within the international arena. It should also avoid projecting an overly "idealistic" pursuit of peace as the bedrock for American foreign policy.

As a necessary prerequisite to formulating such a strategic framework, we need to stand back, dissect and better analyze what makes up the practice of the American democratic process. We need to continue to jealously protect and strive to strengthen its preponderant good features. But, we must also come to a better understanding and guard against those aspects of our practice of democracy which tend to work against our best long term strategic interests. And, in a similar context, we need to better understand and appreciate the capabilities of the Soviet system as it applies to its ability to centrally designate its priorities and to direct its allocation of resources toward the buildup of military power and their conduct of foreign policy. Although Americans do not agree with their priorities, or the resulting subjugation of their peoples liberties and material well being, and although we ultimately believe that such practices will eventually sow the seeds of their own

destruction; it is but wishful thinking to believe that anything in the foreseeable future will weaken the resolve of Soviet leadership from their steadfast strategy of world domination.

A STRATEGIC OUTLINE

This strategic outline is derived from the above review of NSC-68, the critiques and embellishments thereof, and from our discussions of significant forces and factors which make our strategic problems all the more challenging today. These recommendations only present general ideas for the framework of a U.S. grand strategy (vs. military strategy) and they are not presumed to be all encompassing.

A U.S. GRAND STRATEGY SHOULD:

BE GLOBAL IN NATURE

- Facilitate understanding of isolated events in a broader context.
- Help position U.S. strengths for maximum strategic value.

BE LONG RANGE IN SCOPE

- Focus on where we want to be 20-50 years out.
- Help us avoid short-term thinking and responses in light of long-term strategic threats and objectives.

CONSIDER ALL ELEMENTS OF U.S. POWER

- Economic, psychological, moral, political, technological, and military elements.
- Facilitate our understanding of the strategic need for protecting and stimulating U.S. national power base.
- Facilitate identifying, integrating and coordinating strategic requirements amongst government agencies.

BE BASED UPON U.S. (AND FREE WORLD) "VITAL" INTERESTS

- Support better calculation of all national "means" to meet the threat.
- Facilitate communication of understandable U.S. strategic interests to the American public, Congress and departments of Federal government.

CLEARLY ARTICULATE THE THREAT

- Facilitate communication of understandable strategic threats to the American public, Congress, and departments of Federal government.
- Foster the development and maintenance of a non-partisan consensus regarding the strategic threat and required responses.

CLEARLY DEFINE AND ARTICULATE U.S.' STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

- Facilitate communication of understandable strategic objectives to American public, Congress and departments of Federal government.
- Foster the development and maintenance of a non-partisan consensus regarding strategic objectives and required responses.
- Help us avoid developing objectives and policies based upon "wishful thinking."

PROVIDE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR RATIONALIZING AND INTEGRATING CAPABILITIES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALLIES

- Improve communications and coordination.
- Facilitate continuity of policies and alliance efforts.
- Encourage mutual support and equitable burden sharing.

BE A LIVING DOCUMENT

- Facilitate continuity of U.S. strategy, policies and efforts.
- Maintain currency and relevancy of U.S. strategy.

PROVIDE UNDERSTANDABLE STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

- Facilitate communicating strategic needs.

PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR MAINTAINING CREDIBLE WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES OVER LONG TERM

- Provide rationale for maintaining strong active forces and forward deployments.
- Provide rationale for maintaining depth and flexibility through viable reserve component forces.
- Provide rationale for maintaining credible manpower and materiel mobilization preparedness planning to increase deterrent value and depth of warfighting capabilities.

I consider it appropriate at this point, lest my intentions be misunderstood, to reflect positively upon the significant efforts of the current administration, with backing from the Congress. The Reagan Administration came into office with an apparent mandate from the American people to restore our military strength and to reestablish the credibility of American free world leadership. Action was swift and continues and has definitely moved us on the right course. Before the job could be completed, however, as we all too well know, we were confronted by the deepest and most persistent recession since the start of World War II which slowed this progress. Many fear today, that much of the public's support has already weakened. Signs now indicate, clearly I believe, that our economy is recovering and that it will hopefully be a more lasting one. It now appears, unfortunately, that the new Congress is less supportive of the defense buildup than was its predecessor, and that we are again heading for a divisive national debate over defense requirements and of priorities between national security, the economy, social and other programs. I applaud the many concurrent improvements which have been made in our strategic planning over the past two years, yet seriously doubt they are as comprehensive as the outline I have suggested herein as desirable, especially concerning incorporation of our many nonmilitary elements of national power. It is also doubtful that they form a sufficient framework from which we can maintain non-partisan Congressional and American public support over the span of several administrations and Congresses. The important test we face is not just success of the immediate defense buildup, but rather whether we can

sustain it over the long run--for at least as long as the threat persists. While applauding the defense gains of this administration, I respectfully persist in pleading the case for us to work closer together as a nation toward a more comprehensive and enduring national strategic framework.

APPENDIX A
³⁴
PERTINENT EXTRACTS FROM NSC-68

Fundamental design of the Kremlin.

The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control . . . The design calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The U.S. as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one menace or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design. (p. 54)

Objectives.

The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish . . . the Kremlin's challenge is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it.

1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way we affirm our values . . . and in our military and economic strength.
2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.
3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policies and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. (p. 57)

Capabilities.

The Kremlin's policy . . . is to use economic processes to contribute to the overall strength, particularly the warmaking capacity of the Soviet system. The material welfare of the totalitariart is severely subordinated to the interests of the system . . . The total economic strength of the USSR compares with that of the U.S. as roughly one to four . . . The Soviet Union will steadily reduce the discrepancy between its

overall economic strength and that of the U.S. by continuing to devote proportionately more to capital investment than the U.S. . . . The USSR today is on a near maximum production basis . . . In the U.S. . . . a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized. The fact remains, however, that so long as the Soviet Union is virtually mobilized, and the U.S. has scarcely begun to summon up its forces, the greater capabilities of the U.S. are to that extent inoperative in the struggle for power. Moreover, as the Soviet attainment of an atomic capability has demonstrated, the totalitarian state, at least in time of peace, can focus its efforts on any given project far more readily than the democratic state. (p. 63-64) (emphasis added)

Containment. (prior to NSC-68)

Our overall policy . . . one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish . . . embraces two subsidiary policies . . . to develop a healthy international community . . . (and) to contain the Soviet system . . . "containment" . . . seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

In the concept of "containment," the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment." Without superior aggregate military strength . . . a policy of containment . . . is no more than a policy of bluff . . . We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental aspects of "containment." (p. 67-69)

National will and government responsibilities.

The full power which resides within the American people will be evoked only through the traditional democratic process: This process requires, firstly, that sufficient information regarding the basic political, economic and military elements of the present situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed. . . . Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will and a solid resolute expression of that will. The initiative in this process lies with the Government. (p. 68-70) (emphasis added)

. . . The Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military force, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation . . . it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin. (p. 80)

National consensus required.

. . . The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. (p. 108)

FOOTNOTES

¹Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (2d ed., New York: Warner Books, 1981), p. 251.

²Ibid., p. 339.

³W. Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980s, from Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), p. 488.

⁴Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Military Strategy, Military Thought from Machianelli to Hitler (2d ed.; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. vii-xi.

⁵Charles Burton Marshall, "Strategy: The Emerging Dangers" W. Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980s, from Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), pp. 428-430.

⁶Ibid., p. 425.

⁷"NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council, April 14, 1950," Naval War College Review, May/June 1975, p. 53.

⁸Marshal, "Strategy the Emerging Dangers," pp. 434-435.

⁹"NSC-68," Editors Introduction, p. 51.

¹⁰Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "Heritage of Weakness: An Assessment of the 1970s," W. Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980s, from Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), p. 45.

¹¹Sam Nunn, "Defense Budget and Defense Capabilities," W. Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980s, from Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), p. 376.

¹²U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Industrial Base Panel. The Ailing Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 22.

¹³John Tower, "How Much for Arms? In Defense of the Defense Budget," The Washington Post, 6 February 1983, sec. B, p. 8.

¹⁴Zumwalt, "Heritage of Weakness: An Assessment of the 1970s," pp. 43-44.

¹⁵Nixon, The Real War, p. 323.

16 Ibid., p. 13.

17 Ibid., p. 304.

18 Ibid., p. 258.

19 Ibid., p. 8.

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21 Ibid., pp. 256-257.

22 Ibid., p. 322.

23 Don Oberdorfer, "U.S.-Japanese Alliance Reaches a New Stage," The Washington Post, 23 January 1983, sec. A, p. 11.

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25 Marshall, "Strategy: The Emerging Dangers," pp. 433-434.

26 Ibid., p. 431.

27 W. Scott Thompson, "Toward a Strategic Peace," W. Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980s, from Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), pp. 487-488.

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29 Ibid., pp. 260-263.

30 Roderick L. Vawter, "Industrial Base Mobilization," Resource Management Journal, Winter 1981, p. 13.

31 Herman Kahn, The Coming Boom--Economic, Political, and Social (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 162-165.

32 Nixon, The Real War, p. 13.

33 Luttwak, "On the Meaning of Strategy," pp. 270-272.

34 "NSC-68," pp. 54-108.

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1. REPORT NUMBER <i>NDU/ICAF</i>	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. <i>83/051 AD-A137683</i>	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE and Subtitle GRAND STRATEGY--A NECESSARY FRAMEWORK FOR LASTING INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED MSP #47A AY 82/83	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(S) COL JAMES I. MC DOWELL, USA	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES FORT LESLEY J. MC NAIR WASHINGTON, DC 20319	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES FORT LESLEY J. MC NAIR WASHINGTON, DC 20319	12. REPORT DATE MAY 1983	13. NUMBER OF PAGES 55
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS/ <i>if different from Controlling Office</i> NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY FORT LESLEY J. MC NAIR WASHINGTON, DC 20319	15. SECURITY CLASS. <i>(of this report)</i> UNCLASSIFIED	15a. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT <i>(of this Report)</i> UNLIMITED APPROVAL FOR PUBLIC RELEASE	17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT <i>(of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)</i> N/A	
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		
19. KEY WORDS <i>(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)</i> N/A		
20. ABSTRACT <i>(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)</i> This paper looks behind the ups and downs of past United States Defense Preparedness Postures and asks the basic question--Why have our policies and practices not been more consistent over the long term? It relates our ability to maintain credible industrial mobilization preparedness planning to the answer.		

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